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ANOTHER WORD ON THE PRESIDENT'S
STATUTORY AUTHORITY OVER AGENCY
ACTION
Nina A. Mendelson*
By delegating to the "Secretary" or the "Administrator," has Congress
indicated an intent regarding presidential control of executive branch
agencies? This seemingly simple interpretive question has prompted
significant scholarly debate.' In particular, if the statute names an
executive branch agency head as actor, can the President be understood to
possess so-called "directive" authority?
"Directive" authority might be understood to cover the following
situation: the President tells the agency head, "You have prepared materials
indicating that options A, B, and C each satisfies statutory constraints and
could be considered justified on the agency record. The Administration's
choice will be Option A." The President could, of course, offer a reason-
perhaps Option A is the least paternalistic, most protective, or most
innovation-stimulating of the three. If the option preferred by the President
otherwise complies with substantive statutory requirements on the record
prepared by the agency, 2 the question is whether the statutory reference to
"Administrator" or "Secretary" should be understood as a limit on the
President's authority to direct the executive branch agency official to act in
a particular way.
A number of scholars have argued that statutory delegation to an
executive branch agency official means that "the President cannot simply
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks for valuable discussion
and comments especially to Kevin Stack, as well as to Philip Harter, Riyaz Kanji, Sallyanne
Payton, Peter Strauss, and participants in symposia at Fordham Law School and Cardozo
Law School.
1. 1 take no position on whether the Constitution might be read to compel presidential
decisional authority. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549-50 (1994); Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 2-3
(1994); Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696, 702-03 (2007).
2. Beyond "directive authority" is the case in which the President has a rule and
supporting record developed, prepared, and written within the White House and then orders
the agency, without more, to publish it. Although an agency official might have executed
the Federal Register notice, such action would appear to leave the agency no meaningful role
whatsoever. Whatever Congress' specific intent, this would be hard to square with the
language of a simple delegation.
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command or direct an agency head to issue a regulation." 3 These same
scholars generally concede that the President may oversee and substantially
influence agency decisions, such as by prompting agencies to prioritize
particular problems or to coordinate with and take account of another
agency's concerns. Their position that more aggressive direction is
precluded by statute has practical implications that are not fully clear. It
changes little, for example, about the President's recourse against a
recalcitrant agency official. Her primary recourse-whether the statute says
"Administrator," "Secretary," or "President"-remains removal from
office, 4 and she may have other tools as well.5 Outside the area of national
security and foreign relations,6 and within the arena of domestic policy, the
President is highly unlikely to, say, issue a rule in lieu of the agency head
even if the statute says "President."7
So what difference does the answer to the question make? If the
President generally possesses directive authority over executive agency
officials even when the statute's delegation of authority is to the
"Administrator" or the "Secretary," it may reduce the need to reach the
arguments of unitary executive theorists that the Constitution requires such
authority.8
Beyond this, other commentators have argued that the primary difference
it makes is in attitude. If the President's role is improperly
mischaracterized as the "Decider," Professor Peter Strauss's term, an
agency official might be prompted to discount the agency's own view of the
proper decision and, within statutory bounds, feel committed to follow the
3. Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An
Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007); accord
Strauss, supra note 1, at 759 ("If [statutory] text chooses between President as overseer of
the resulting assemblage, and President as necessarily entitled 'decider,' the implicit
message is that of oversight, not decision.").
4. See Sargentich, supra note 3, at 7; Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory
Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 263, 293-96 (2006); Strauss, supra
note 1, at 716. Professor Kevin Stack's position amplified one also noted by Professor
Robert V. Percival. See Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative
State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DuKE L.J. 963, 1008 (2001) (noting express
presidential authority over agency decisions in some statutes but not others).
5. See, e.g., Sargentich, supra note 3, at 8 (noting importance of "stay[ing] on the good
side of White House officials").
6. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (bureaucratic obstacles likely to
preclude President from signing Federal Register notices even if statute delegates authority
to President; noting President has only rarely signed such a notice since 1981).
8. Stack has pointed out that if a simple delegation is understood to limit presidential
directive authority, unitary executive advocates must apply the constitutional avoidance
doctrine to argue that the statutes nonetheless permit presidential direction or else argue that
the statutes are unconstitutional. Stack, supra note 3, at 299 ("This conclusion forces
proponents of a strongly unitary executive to invoke constitutional avoidance principles.").
Stack also argues that the answer to the question also has implications for the applicability of
the Chevron doctrine and the validity of executive orders, issues beyond the scope of this
paper in view of my conclusion that simple delegations generally communicate no particular
intent to limit presidential control. See Stack, supra note 4, at 307-14.
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President's instructions. 9  Two consequences that are potentially
undesirable from a policy perspective might follow: first, an agency official
might perceive that she is less able to resist an incorrect-or worse-
presidential viewpoint, even if she sees it as a poor exercise of discretion.10
Second, agency accountability for decision making might be reduced if the
official is able to say, "The President made me do it.""
Then-professor, now Justice, Elena Kagan argued in 2001 that a
reasonable interpretive principle is to understand a delegation to an
executive branch agency as Congress leaving open, rather than foreclosing,
the possibility of presidential directive authority.12 She made this argument
in view of the backdrop of removal authority, the history of presidential
oversight of agency regulatory activity, and other presidential actions.
Congress, she argued, should be understood as delegating authority against
the backdrop of presidential control. She further argued that the "very
subtlety of the line between directive authority and other tools of
presidential control," such as influence, "provides reason to doubt any
congressional intent to disaggregate them."' 3 She suggested that the most
likely explanation is that Congress has no specific intent on the matter. She
conceded, however, that her argument could be defeated if "Congress
sometimes stipulated that a delegation of power to an agency official was
subject to the ultimate control of the President."1 4
Professor Kevin Stack took up Kagan's invitation and, in 2006, in a
thorough and meticulous analysis, presented a variety of such so-called
mixed delegations. He reasoned that Congress's use of delegations only to
the President, including to act "through" a specified agency, or to agency
heads subject to explicit presidential approval strongly implied that
statutory delegations just to executive branch officials-so-called simple
delegations-were meant to curb the President's authority.' 5
In this short symposium contribution, I attempt first to add some further
evidence on the interpretive question. That evidence weighs strongly, in
my view, in favor of Kagan's conclusion that the terminology does not
communicate any particular congressional intent regarding presidential
directive authority. Assessed in context, the "whole code" textual analysis
presented by Stack does not justify the conclusion that Congress, by
9. Strauss, supra note 1, at 704.
10. See id. at 736; Stack, supra note 4, at 296.
11. Sargentich, supra note 3, at 9.
12. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2327-28
(2001). Stack discusses the extent to which Kagan's position was anticipated in the 1920s
by James Hart. See Stack, supra note 4, at 294 ("Hart contended that these delegations do
not support the inference that the President lacked authority to bind an agency's discretion
when the delegation ran only to the agency." (citing JAMES HART, THE ORDINANCE MAKING
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 195 n.30 (1925)).
13. Id at 2328.
14. Id at 2329.
15. Stack, supra note 4, at 277 ("[I]n view of these express provisions of presidential
control in delegations to executive officials, delegations to executive officials alone-
'simple delegations'-should not be read to grant directive authority to the President.").
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delegating to an executive branch official, meant to limit presidential
control. Independent agencies excluded, interpreting the terms of simple
and presidential delegations to speak to directive authority fails, in general,
to make sense of the various statutes. Absent any special legislative
context, the most reasonable interpretation of these words is that neither a
presidential delegation nor a simple delegation to an executive agency
speaks to presidential directive authority. Instead, Congress's intent in
delegating to the President appears to be simply to convey the additional
power to choose which executive branch agency official will be primarily
responsible for carrying out a statutory delegation.
Moreover, even if simple delegations could be interpreted to limit
presidential directive authority, it is unclear that the interpretation would
have the claimed beneficial effect of increasing the resistance of individual
agency officials to White House pressure.
Policy matters and the legitimacy of White House control weigh heavily
in Kagan's arguments as well as in the arguments of Robert Percival, Stack,
Strauss, and Thomas Sargentich. I conclude with a few observations on the
normative debate on presidential control. I also suggest that we put aside
the interpretive arguments and focus instead on greater disclosure of the
content of that control. Disclosure may be particularly helpful not only in
helping us resolve the legitimacy of presidential direction, but also in
informing clearer legislation.
I. Do "SIMPLE DELEGATIONS" IMPLY A STATUTORY LIMIT ON
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY?
At the outset, I put aside delegations to independent agencies, which,
with their typical limits on presidential removal of agency officials, are
widely understood as communicating Congress's intent to minimize
presidential directive authority.
In the setting of executive branch agency programs, the best reading of
the words "President" and "Administrator" is that they reveal no
generalized congressional intent regarding presidential control. Instead, the
use of the term "President" is best understood as a general matter to permit
the President to assign primary implementation responsibility to an
executive branch agency of her choice. 7 Correspondingly, the use of the
term "Administrator" or "Secretary" is best understood as limiting the
President's authority to assign implementation responsibility to an agency
other than that named in the statute, rather than addressing the extent of
directive authority. First, as Kagan argued, in the domestic policy arena,
16. See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2329 (the interpretation "enables the President to
choose who will function as the initial (and, in practice, usually the ultimate)
decisionmaker").
17. Id. As discussed below, the special context of some statutes may suggest that
Congress occasionally does envision greater direct presidential supervision. See, e.g., infra
notes 71, 79 and accompanying text (on Computer Security Act of 1987, later amended by
E-Government Act of 2002).
[Vol. 792458
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Congress delegates authority to executive branch agencies against a well-
known backdrop of presidential oversight of and involvement in executive
agency decisions, particularly agency regulatory decisions.18 That weighs
against an interpretation of "Administrator" or "Secretary" as limiting
presidential directive authority.
Prominent in that backdrop, of course, is presidential power to remove
executive branch officials. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,19 the
Constitution's notion of "executive power" has long been understood to
include the traditional power to remove, unless expressly limited by
statute. 20 Since 1981, moreover, the President has publicly and formally
asserted regulatory review clearance authority with respect to significant
executive branch agency rules. Agencies are not to publish significant
proposed or final rules without the explicit or implicit approval of the
Office of Management and Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs. 21 Even prior to 1981, Presidents were known to "jawbone" the
agencies. 22 Finally, it is widely known that executive agency budget
requests, legislative positions, and testimony before Congress are all
systematically coordinated and "cleared" through White House offices so
that a unified executive branch position can be presented. 23
Even with a delegation straight to the "Administrator" or the "Secretary,"
then, Congress is likely to expect potentially substantial presidential
oversight of a wide range of executive branch agency actions.24 Indeed, the
scholars arguing against directive authority concede that the statutes should
be understood to permit substantial presidential influence over executive
branch agency officials. 25  That influence, of course, can facilitate
18. Kagan, supra note 12, at 2328.
19. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
20. Id. at 3151-52 (discussing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117, 164 (1926)).
21. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R.
127 (1982), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. at 638.
22. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte
Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 943 (1980).
23. See, e.g., Percival, supra note 4, at 983-84.
24. This conclusion would be different if the agency action were a formal adjudication
or rulemaking subject to ex parte contact restrictions under the Administrative Procedure Act
or authorizing statute. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2006);
Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1545 (9th Cir.
1993) (prohibition on ex parte contacts applied to President when formal adjudication
decision vested in other agency officials).
25. See Sargentich, supra note 3, at 19 ("The key distinction under the traditional view
in any event is the one between presidential influence or persuasion on the one hand, and
presidential command and direction on the other."); Stack, supra note 4, at 294 ("All of this
authority means that the President is likely to be able to implement his policy through
executive branch agencies . . . ."); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the
President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 200 (1986); see also
Proposed Executive Order Entitled "Federal Regulation," 5 Op. O.L.C. 59, 61 (1981) ("We
believe that an inquiry into congressional intent in enacting statutes delegating rulemaking
authority will usually support the legality of presidential supervision of rulemaking by
executive agencies.").
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interagency coordination and broad policy direction by an electorally
accountable official. There seems little dispute that a simple statutory
delegation permits the President to influence-even direct-an agency to
address one problem over another-to prioritize air pollution control over
hazardous waste cleanup, say- or to require executive branch agencies not
to take conflicting approaches with one another. At the other end of the
continuum, there seems little dispute that the language of the simple
delegation ought to be understood to bar the President from, say, signing a
Federal Register notice in lieu of the agency official or perhaps even from
having White House officials conduct an entire rulemaking procedure from
start to finish, having the agency only publish the rule. That would leave
the agency with a purely formal role.
But does a simple delegation convey any congressional intent to limit the
President from directing an agency official to act or to make a choice
among available options? Beyond the backdrop of removal authority and
presidential involvement in agency decision making, if the choice of the
word "Administrator" or "Secretary" were meant to convey a limit on
presidential direction, one also might expect to see some indication in the
legislative history accompanying statutes making such delegations.
Although legislative history accompanying delegations to independent
agencies does sometimes make mention of insulated decision making-or
at least terms the agencies "independent"-the legislative history of
statutory delegations to executive branch agency heads does not seem to do
more than mention that the delegation is to the official in question. For
example, the Clean Air Act's 26 delegation to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to set national ambient air quality standards was
accompanied by a comment in the legislative history mentioning only that
delegation-there is no mention of insulation or independence. 27 Similarly,
the legislative history of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,28
which delegates authority to the Secretary of Labor, does discuss separation
of powers concerns and insulation, but only with respect to the advisability
of combining enforcement and standard-setting in the same agency.29 it
appears to contain no discussion of whether the Secretary should be
insulated from presidential oversight, but discusses only whether it is
appropriate to insulate enforcement within the agency.30 This is not to say
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5356
("The Secretary of [the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] will be authorized
and directed to establish nationwide ambient air quality standards."). The President is not
mentioned in the report.
28. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
29. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655 (authorizing Secretary to set standards); id § 657
(authorizing Secretary to inspect and investigate workplaces for compliance with standards).
30. See S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 8 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5184-
85 ("Rather than dividing responsibility by creating yet another agency, the committee
believes that a sounder program will result if responsibility for the formulation of rules is
assigned to the same administrator who [is] also responsible for their enforcement and for
[Vol. 792460
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that the apparent absence of legislative history is dispositive, 3 1 but it is
suggestive. By contrast, the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
created in the Dodd-Frank legislation, 32 headed by an official who is
removable only for cause, is specifically described as an "independent
bureau" in its legislative history. 33
In short, the backdrop and legislative context of simple delegations,
compared with independent agency delegations, do not support the
interpretation that simple delegations, like independent agency delegations,
are meant to insulate the agency from the exercise of presidential directive
authority.
Further, if a delegation straight to an executive branch agency official
were meant generally by Congress to insulate the official from presidential
direction, a statutory delegation to the President should mean Congress
intends correspondingly greater presidential supervisory or directive
authority. That reading must be rejected. As a general matter, the term
"President" generally cannot reasonably be understood to represent any
greater expectation of presidential involvement than with a simple
delegation. Correspondingly, there cannot be an implication that the term
"Secretary" or "Administrator," at least within the executive branch, means
less.
Consider first the exponential growth in the size of the administrative
state. 34 From this alone, one could infer that a reasonable Congress would
expect the President to make few, if any, decisions personally, undermining
any inference of expected presidential direction from repeated uses of the
term "President."
seeing that they are workable and effective in their day-to-day application, thus permitting
cohesive administration of a total program. In the committee's view, the question of
separation of power is not so much one of whether the Secretary should be separated from
the power to set standards, but whether he should be separated from the power to administer
an integral program, and from the power of the Congress and the public to hold him
accountable for the overall implementation of that program.").
31. Cf Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the assumption that "dogs will bark when something important is happening").
32. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
33. See H.R. REP. No. 111-517, at 599-600 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730-31 (describing director as removable only for cause, and the bureau
as an "independent bureau"); see also H.R. REP. No. 111-703, at 21 (2011) (describing
Bureau as "[led by an independent director," with "[i]ndependent [bludget" and
"[i]ndependent [r]ule [w]riting" powers).
34. STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD STEWART, CASS SUNSTEIN & MATHEW L. SPITZER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 1 (5th ed.
2002) ("Much of modem life is a product, in large part, of the activities of administrative
agencies. The range of administrative government is remarkably wide . . . ."); 1 RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.3, at 8 (5th ed. 2010) ("The size and scope
of federal administrative activity has increased during every period in the nation's history.");
Meredith Abernathy, Running on Empty: Will Exxon Mobil Cause a Breakdown for
Chevron and the Administrative State?, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 583, 592 (2007) (noting
"rapid proliferation in both the number and variety of agencies").
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Beyond this, Congress explicitly recognized the limits on presidential
capacity by creating a regime that gives the President complete autonomy to
choose which decisions she will make when he receives a delegation of
statutory authority. In 1951, Congress enacted the Presidential
Subdelegation Act of 1950,35 partly in response to complaints from
President Harry S. Truman that the burden of individual approvals and
other paperwork was occupying "'3 hours every night."' 36 That Act
permits the President to redelegate to an executive branch agency official,
through executive order, any power she has received under statute, leaving
her the unfettered choice either to reserve formal approval authority or to
condition that delegation on such "terms, conditions, and limitations as the
President may deem advisable."37  In short, through the Presidential
Subdelegation Act, Congress formally repudiated any understanding of the
term "President" as conveying a requirement-or even an expectation-of
personal Presidential direction or decision making.
Moreover, in actual practice and at least in the domestic policy setting,
the President nearly always formally and publicly redelegates these
statutory authorities. Numerous presidential executive orders and
memoranda delegate statutory functions to individual executive branch
officials.38 Occasionally these documents are used to revise and reassign
earlier delegations, though I have yet to locate an outright revocation of
such a delegation. 39 Although executive orders sometimes require agency
35. Pub. L. No. 81-673, 64 Stat. 419 (codified at 3 U.S.C. §§ 301-303 (2006)).
36. See Verkuil, supra note 22, at 966 (quoting S. REP. No. 81-1867, at 1 (1950),
reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2931, 2931); see also Percival, supra note 4, at 1007-08.
37. See 3 U.S.C. § 301 ("The President ... is authorized to designate and empower the
head of any department or agency in the executive branch .. . to perform without approval,
ratification, or other action by the President (1) any function which is vested in the President
by law, or (2) any function which such officer is required or authorized by law to perform
only with or subject to the approval, ratification, or other action of the President . . . .").
Specific authorities to designate-though they are clearly not necessary after the Presidential
Subdelegation Act-appear in other statutes as well. See, e.g., Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 3107(d), 116 Stat. 134, 296 (codified with
some differences in language at 7 U.S.C. § 1736-1).
38. For a few of the numerous examples, see, for example, Exec. Order No. 13,419, 3
C.F.R. 256 (2007) (delegating authorities to Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, in consultation with NASA and the Departments of Defense and
Transportation); George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management (July 8, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 45,155 (July 31, 2003) (codified at 5 C.F.R. pt.
724 (2009)); George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agriculture (Mar. 11,
2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 12,569 (Mar. 17, 2003) (delegating authorities to Secretary of
Agriculture); William J. Clinton, Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (Aug. 19, 1993), 58 Fed. Reg. 52,397 (Oct. 8, 1993); Exec. Order No.
12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1988) (delegating presidential authority under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to agencies including
the EPA, Coast Guard, and the Departments of Interior, Commerce, and Health and Human
Services (HHS)).
39. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,308, 3 C.F.R. 239 (2004); Exec. Order No. 13,286, 3
C.F.R. 166 (2004).
2462 [Vol. 79
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officials receiving a delegation to consult with other agencies, 40 I also have
yet to locate a delegation of authority under a domestic statute where the
President has elected to retain any approval authority over presidential
authority delegated to an agency.
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,4 1
for example, delegates a wide range of authorities to the President,
including the authority not only to declare a disaster but to enter into
contracts, give warnings, distribute food vouchers, arrange for mass
feedings, and provide transportation to individuals dislocated by disaster.42
Presidents have delegated the overwhelming majority of Stafford Act
authorities among several executive branch agencies, 43 retaining only the
authority to declare the existence of a national disaster.44 The President has
retained no approval authority over the rest of the decisions delegated to
agency officials. And the retention of the disaster-declaring authority
seems unusual. In general, presidents do not, for example, personally
promulgate rules. (Electronic searching of the Federal Register since
January 1981 has identified only two issues where rules seem to be signed
or approved by sitting Presidents: the procedures for requesting a
presidential pardon and the tolls charged on the Panama Canal.45) In the
40. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,777, sec. 1, 3 C.F.R. 351, 352-53 (1992) (delegating
Oil Pollution Act authorities to EPA and the Departments of Interior, Commerce, and
Transportation, including some delegations based on location of spill); George W. Bush,
Memorandum for the Secretary of Agriculture (Mar. 11, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 12,569 (Mar.
17, 2003) (requiring Secretary of Agriculture to consult with Food Policy Assistance Council
and other heads of federal departments and agencies).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207.
42. See generally id.
43. Most delegations are now to the Department of Homeland Security; past delegations
have named Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of Defense (DOD). See Exec. Order No. 13,286, 3
C.F.R. 166 (2004); Exec. Order No. 12,673, 3 C.F.R. 214 (1990); Exec. Order No. 12,148, 3
C.F.R. 412 (1980) (superseded 1994). Over time, a substantial number of functions
originally distributed among agencies have become consolidated in FEMA.
44. See Exec. Order No. 12,673, 3 C.F.R. 214 (1990).
45. In January, 2011, I performed the following Westlaw search in the Federal Register
database: ca("final rule" "rules and regulations") su("final rule" "rules and regulations")
pr("rules and regulations" "final rule") & (((george /3 bush) (william /3 clinton) (barack /3
obama) (ronald /3 reagan)) w/15 (signed dated approved issued)). That database covers all
Federal Register publications beginning in January, 1981. The search identified 120 relevant
documents, each of which I personally reviewed. Of those documents, the President
executed rules regarding presidential pardon applications. See Department of Justice, Office
of the Pardon Attorney, Rules Governing Petitions for Executive Clemency, Victim
Notification and Comment, 65 Fed. Reg. 58,223 (Sept. 28, 2000) (codified as amended at 28
C.F.R. § 1.6 (2010)) (expressly approved by President Clinton); Department of Justice,
Office of the Pardon Attorney, Rules Governing Petitions for Executive Clemency, Capital
Cases, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,379 (Aug. 8, 2000) (codified as amended at 28 C.F.R. § 1.10 (2010))
(expressly approved by President Clinton); Department of Justice, Office of the Pardon
Attorney, Rules Governing Petitions for Executive Clemency, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,658 (Oct. 18,
1993) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 1 (2010)) (expressly approved by President Clinton).
Besides the pardon rules, the only others appeared to relate to tolls on the Panama Canal. See
The President, Panama Canal Commission, Tolls for Use of Canal and Rules for
Measurement of Vessels, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,254 (Aug. 22, 1994) (signed by President
2011] 2463
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domestic policy setting, the very rare provision that precludes the President
from delegating a determination to the executive branch agencies confirms
the congressional expectation that agencies, rather than the President, will
be primarily responsible for statutory implementation, including the
issuance of rules, even when the statute says "President." 46
In short, the Presidential Subdelegation Act, as well as the sheer size of
the administrative state, the practice of presidential delegation of statutory
authorities without reservation into the agencies, and the rarity of direct
presidential rulemaking, all tend to negate any conclusion that Congress's
use of the term "President" generally means that the President is obligated,
or even expected, to formally act or decide under the statute. The
Presidential Subdelegation Act communicates Congress's understanding
that, notwithstanding its use of the word "President" in authorizing statutes,
agencies could properly implement the statutes with no presidential
involvement whatsoever. Instead, it is simply the President's choice how
much to supervise, direct, or approve.
Given this pattern of statutory enactments, as well as of legislative
context, delegation to the "President" in the domestic setting would be
better understood not as communicating an intent regarding presidential
supervision or direction, but instead as a first step to the powers ultimately
arriving in an executive agency, the head of which is, of course, removable
at the President's will. That agency would simply be selected by the
President rather than by Congress. As Kagan argued, a delegation straight
to an executive branch agency, then, simply amounts to a limitation on the
President's ability to assign the task elsewhere. 47
This understanding of congressional intent also avoids a significant
difficulty regarding the application of the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA). If the use of the term "President" were meant to convey a
Clinton); The President, Panama Canal Commission, Tolls for Use of Canal, 57 Fed. Reg.
37,066 (Aug. 17, 1992) (signed by President George H.W. Bush); The President, Panama
Canal Commission, Tolls for Use of Canal and Rules for Measurement of Vessels, 54 Fed.
Reg. 35,148 (Aug. 23, 1989) (signed by President George H.W. Bush).
I also used the following search in the Federal Register database to identify rules whose
source might be the Executive Office of the President: ca("final rule" "rules and
regulations") su("final rule" "rules and regulations") pr("rules and regulations" "final rule")
/10 "executive office." The search identified a few rules executed either by officials of
agencies within the Executive Office of the President (EOP): the Council on Environmental
Quality, the Office of Management Budget, or the U.S. Trade Representative. The search
uncovered two rules issued directly by the EOP: one on standards of conduct for employees
of the executive office of the President, see Executive Office of the President, Repeal of
Standards of Conduct for Employees of the Executive Office of the President, 64 Fed. Reg.
12,881 (Mar. 16, 1999) (codified at 3 C.F.R. pt. 100 (2010)), and one on equal employment
opportunity, see Enforcement of Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Federally
Conducted Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,872 (July 8, 1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of C.F.R.). Neither was executed by the President.
46. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f) (permitting President to suspend certain air quality
regulations in the event of a national or regional emergency and providing that "[s]uch
determination shall not be delegable by the President to any other person").
47. See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2329.
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congressional expectation that the President would exercise directive or
decisional authority, it might raise concerns that a large number of such
decisions also should be understood as insulated from APA review under
the doctrine of Franklin v. Massachusetts.48 In Franklin, the Supreme
Court held that the President was not an agency within the meaning of the
APA and that presidential decisions were thus immune from statutory
review under the APA.49 Instead, we can infer that--consistent with
maintaining the widespread availability of APA review-Congress's
expectation and intent generally is that agencies, subject to the APA, will
exercise all these powers, whether the delegation is simple or to the
President.so
It might also be argued, however, that even if Congress contemplated
that, generally, the President would not personally implement or direct the
particular statutory authorities, the reference to the "President" could still
indicate an authorization, if not an expectation, for behind-the-scenes
direction of an agency's decision. By delegating straight to an agency
official, then, we could understand Congress as refusing the President such
directive authority.
Since "President" cannot fairly be read as a generalized congressional
expectation of greater presidential control, its omission in a simple
delegation is weak support for reading that language as congressional intent
to limit presidential control. In addition, such an interpretation does not
make sense of some well-known statutory delegations. Those delegations
are not consistent with understanding the term "President" to authorize
greater presidential direction and the term "Administrator" or "Secretary" to
limit that power.51
Consider first the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act 52 (CERCLA, or Superfund). That statute
delegates most decisions to the President. Delegations under CERCLA to
48. 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
49. Id. at 800-01 (President not an "agency" for APA purposes). Stack has discussed
possible nonstatutory forms of review of the President's exercise of statutory authorities,
even in the absence of APA review. See Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the
President's Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1169, 1194 (2009) ("Franklin [v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992)] did not eliminate review of the President's compliance
with statute outside the APA.").
50. See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2351 (discussing Franklin) ("When the challenge is to
an action delegated to an agency head but directed by the President . . . the review
provisions usually applicable to that agency's action should govern."). Particular statutory
contexts might suggest that Congress specifically intended the President to be personally
involved, and some of those contexts are discussed below. The point here, however, is that a
text's reference to the "President" alone would not convey an intent to insulate the decision
from APA review. See also Strauss, supra note 1, at 713 (citing EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 80 (4th rev. ed. 1957)) (discussing Corwin's
analysis of the APA issue).
5 1. The exception here would be that in a delegation to the "President," the President
would have power to revoke or reassign the delegation; I have yet to locate an outright
revocation, though Presidents do sometimes reassign delegations to other agencies.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
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the President include the authority to devise the so-called National
Contingency Plan-a plan for responding to releases of hazardous
substances into the environment. 53 Presidential delegations also include the
power to investigate and to undertake response actions to address hazardous
waste contamination at individual sites.54  Congress's expectation in
delegating to the President in CERCLA could not possibly have been that
the President would be supervising individual site cleanup decisions-or
responding to individual cases of hazardous waste contamination-at the
thousands of contaminated sites across the country. Such decision making
would simply be infeasible. Indeed, in the executive orders delegating
CERCLA authorities, the President has reserved no express approval or
review authority over any CERCLA decisions, outside whatever influence
might be exercised through the regulatory review process for setting overall
cleanup standards.
Nor would it be reasonable to draw any inference that Congress
specifically intended greater presidential supervision over individual site
cleanup decisions compared with certain other decisions allocated to
agencies. Take first the Clean Air Act. That statute delegates most powers
directly to the Administrator of the EPA, including the setting of national
ambient air quality standards and numerous air emissions limitations. 55
That Act was most recently extensively revised in 1990, well after the
formalization and institutionalization of regulatory review. 56 The EPA has
set and revised national ambient air quality standards for only six criteria air
pollutants, and compliance with these standards, if set with any degree of
stringency, can be extremely costly. These are the sort of infrequent and
high impact decisions a President could feasibly monitor. Under the
current regulatory review executive order, a national ambient air quality
standard would clearly qualify as an "economically significant rule" subject
to Office of Management and Budget/Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OMB/OIRA) review, and White House influence in such decisions
has been reported prominently. 57  Even if Congress did not desire
presidential supervision of air quality standard setting, it is not reasonable
to infer that Congress must have intended greater presidential direction of
53. Id. § 9605(a) ("[T]he President shall, after notice and opportunity for public
comments, revise and republish the national contingency plan for the removal of oil and
hazardous substances .... ).
54. See, e.g., id. § 9604(a)(1) ("[T]he president is authorized to act, consistent with the
national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial
action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time . . . .").
55. See, e.g., id. § 7408 (delegation to Administrator to set national ambient air quality
standards); id. § 7521 (delegation to Administrator to set new car emissions standards).
56. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 219, 104 Stat.
2399, 2492-2500 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7545).
57. E.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., Top E.P.A. Official Not Backing Down on Air Standards,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1997, at Al (describing White House review of national ambient air
quality for ozone and fine chemical particles); Editorial, Decision Time on Clean Air, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 1997, at A26 (describing regulatory process as EPA "propos[ing] to the
White House" standards for air pollution).
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individual site cleanup decisions compared with the issuance of national
ambient air quality standards.
Go one step further. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA)58 also addresses individual site contamination cleanup
decisions, those made at existing hazardous waste disposal facilities. These
cleanups can closely resemble CERCLA cleanups. Yet the statute delegates
control over these cleanup decisions not to the President, as with CERCLA,
but to the EPA Administrator.59 Under both RCRA and CERCLA, literally
thousands of contaminated sites are involved. 60 Differences in expected
presidential involvement could not possibly explain why Congress would
delegate authority over cleanups to the "President" in numerous sections of
CERCLA while delegating similar authority to the Administrator in
RCRA. 61
And one further example: the Stafford Act delegates most authorities to
the President, including the authority to distribute food vouchers, arrange
for mass feedings, and provide transportation to individuals dislocated by
disaster. 62  Compare that to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program, which delegates the authority to "formulate and administer" a
food stamp program to the Secretary of Agriculture, so that "eligible
households ... shall be provided an opportunity to obtain a more nutritious
diet."63 It is hard to articulate a plausible reason why Congress would want
more direct presidential supervision of the distribution of food vouchers in
the disaster setting and less over the program to distribute assistance under
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. In short, in the domestic
policy setting, understanding "Administrator" or "Secretary" as more
insulating from presidential direction compared with delegations to the
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987.
59. See, e.g., id. § 6924(u) (providing that Administrator shall require "corrective action
for all releases of hazardous waste" from permitted treatment, storage, or disposal facility,
"regardless of the time at which waste was placed in such unit").
60. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, RCRA ORIENTATION MANUAL, at 111-123 (2008), available at
http://www.epa.gov/osw/inforesources/pubs/orientat/rom.pdf ("Approximately 3,800 sites
are undergoing corrective action, three times the number of sites found on the Superfund
National Priorities List . . . ."); id. at VI-9 to -14 (chapter section entitled "CERCLA: The
Hazardous Waste Cleanup Program"); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund,
Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011)
("Over the past 20+ years, we've located and analyzed tens of thousands of hazardous waste
sites, protected people and the environment from contamination at the worst sites, and
involved others in cleanup.").
61. Most CERCLA authorities have been delegated to the EPA Administrator; no
presidential approval has been reserved. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1988).
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5179-5180 (regarding food); id. § 5186 (regarding transportation).
63. 7 U.S.C. § 2013. Compare id. (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to administer
a supplemental nutrition assistance program), and id § 2014 (authorizing Secretary to set
eligibility requirements for food stamps), with 42 U.S.C. § 5180 (authorizing President to
ensure that "adequate stocks of food will be ready and conveniently available"), and id.
§ 5179 (authorizing President to act "through the Secretary of Agriculture or other
appropriate agencies" to distribute food coupons through existing programs and to make
surplus commodities available).
2011] 2467
HeinOnline  -- 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2467 2010-2011
FORDHAMLA WREVIEW
"President," simply does not make sense of delegations currently on the
books.
What makes far more sense is the interpretation that a delegation to the
President does not communicate a particular intent regarding presidential
direction of agency authority, but instead generally signifies simply that the
President can select the executive branch official who receives the statutory
delegation. 64 That is consistent with the workings of our administrative
state, in which the President is widely known on occasion to exercise
substantial control over executive branch agencies but cannot reasonably be
expected to systematically make a particular individual decision himself.
Thus, a delegation to the Administrator under the Clean Air Act (to set
national ambient air quality standards) or under RCRA (to decide what a
hazardous waste disposal facility owner must do to address site
contamination) is not meaningless relative to the President; it precludes the
President from assigning that authority to, say, the Secretary of Agriculture
or the Secretary of Commerce. Nor can the President assign authority over
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program to the Secretary of Energy
or of Commerce.
This interpretation also makes sense of the varied presidential delegations
described above. The presidential delegations are all examples in which
more than one agency might have relevant institutional expertise or
programmatic authority to run a program. A better reading of the
delegations is that Congress intended to enlist presidential expertise
regarding the work of particular executive branch agencies. CERCLA, for
example, covers both offshore and onshore contamination, federal facilities,
as well as the restoration of injured natural resources. 65 Multiple federal
agencies may have relevant programmatic expertise, ranging from the EPA
(cleanup standards and inland cleanups), the Coast Guard (offshore
contamination), and the Commerce Department (coastal resources), to the
Departments of Agriculture (national forests), Interior (national parks and
wildlife), and Defense and Energy (federal facilities). Presidents have
delegated CERCLA authorities sometimes to a single agency and
sometimes jointly to multiple agencies, depending on the particular
provision.66 In addition, the Oil Pollution Act of 199067 delegates most
authorities to the President. Spills could take place inland, on coastal areas,
64. Kagan, supra note 12, at 2329.
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) (defining "environment" to include "navigable waters, . . .
ocean waters, ... any other surface water . .. land surface, or ambient air within the United
States or under the jurisdiction of the United States"); id. § 9601(16) (defining "natural
resources" to include "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air water, ground water, drinking water
supplies, and other such resources, belonging to, managed by, held in trust by ... the United
States . . . , any State or local government, any foreign government, [or] any Indian
tribe . . . ."); id. § 9620(a)(1) (applying statute to "[e]ach department, agency, and
instrumentality of the United States"); id. § 9620(a)(2) (applying statute to "facilities which
are owned or operated by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States").
66. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1988).
67. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
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or in deep water. In each location, a different agency might offer both
expertise and the advantages of efficiency, given its other institutional
responsibilities. By executive order, the President has delegated lead
response authority for oil spills on the coastline to the Coast Guard.
Meanwhile, the President has designated the EPA as the lead agency for
spills in the inland zone. Both are required to consult with a variety of
other agencies and with state and local government. Different federal
agencies (including the Departments of Defense, Interior, and Agriculture)
are designated as natural resource trustees for purposes of assessing and
restoring injury to natural resources. 68 Finally, the Stafford Act involves
providing housing, transportation, and food to disaster victims, a range of
issues implicating the expertise of multiple agencies.
By contrast, delegation to a particular executive branch agency official
may simply signify Congress's awareness of agency expertise and
experience and its intent that a new program be coordinated with and
benefit from the expertise a particular agency has already developed in
running related programs. The RCRA 69 statute, for example, mainly
regulates land-based hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal
facilities; accordingly, it makes sense that Congress would delegate most
responsibilities to the EPA, since some of that agency's other programs
also cover inland polluting activity. 70
Outside of statutes with implications for defense or foreign relations or
other statutes with an unusual context, 71 it thus makes most sense to
68. See Exec. Order No. 12,777, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 351, 352-53 (1992).
69. See supra notes 58-59.
70. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939f (setting out hazardous waste management regime,
including regulation of treatment, storage, and disposal).
71. For example, section 4 of the Computer Security Act of 1987, later incorporated into
the E-Government Act of 2002, called for specific, nondelegable presidential review of
Department of Commerce standards for computer security. See Computer Security Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, § 4, 100 Stat. 1724, 1726 (1988), amended by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 5101, 110 Stat. 186,
later incorporated into the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 302(a), 116
Stat. 2899, 2956 (ultimately codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 11331); E-Govemment Act
of 2002 § 302(a), 116 Stat. at 2956 ("The President's authority to disapprove or modify such
standards and guidelines may not be delegated."). The Computer Security Act of 1987
represented a strong reaction to the 1985 and 1986 issuance of directives placing control of
information security in the DOD, including both classified and sensitive but unclassified
information. As described in a hearing prior to the legislation, these directives expanded
"DOD's control [over] a wide spectrum of scientific, economic and cultural information in
our [njation." See Computer Security Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 145 Before a
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 100th Cong. 382 (1987) (statement of Rep.
Jack Brooks). Because of congressional concern over the "'Big Brother' activities of DOD
and NSA," the bill placed control of information security in a civilian agency, the
Department of Commerce, but with specific presidential oversight in view of the national
security implications. H.R. REP. No. 100-153, pt. 2, at 7 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3157, 3159. As the Report explained, "The bill also establishes a presidential
review process whereby the Secretary of Commerce can be directed to modify or rescind a
standard when the President determines it is in the public interest to do so." Id. at 10, 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3162. The statute was ultimately modified to eliminate the presidential
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understand all these delegations-whether to the President, the Secretary, or
the Administrator-simply as delegations into the executive branch, headed
as it is by a Chief Executive with the power to remove agency heads at will.
A delegation to the President generally communicates no distinct intent
regarding presidential direction or control, but means simply that the
President can select the agency. With respect to presidential directive
authority, Congress's general intent in delegating to the Administrator or
the Secretary, as opposed to the President, may best be reflected, in Kagan's
words, in an "interpretive principle presuming an undifferentiated
presidential control of executive agency officials." 72
For a recent example that clearly shows the meaning (or absence of
meaning) of a presidential delegation in the setting of domestic legislation,
consider the 2009 federal climate change legislative proposals.73 The so-
called Waxman-Markey legislation had passed the House and the Senate
was considering climate change bills. Agriculture groups wanted the
Department of Agriculture to run part of a proposed climate change
program defining which greenhouse-gas-reducing agricultural projects
would qualify to create saleable "offsets" for greenhouse gas emissions
generated elsewhere. The Waxman-Markey bill assigned (and
environmentalists preferred) responsibility for defining such offsets to the
EPA. 74 In the Senate bill, compromise was reached on the issue by
delegating authority to the President to, post-enactment, select the relevant
agency. None of the word choices-"Secretary," "Administrator," or
"President"-appeared to relate to presidential supervision, direction, or the
lack thereof. The Senate bill used presidential delegation simply to dodge,
through delegation, the question of which executive branch agency would
have primary responsibility for developing offset rules.75
Are there more arguments from statutory text that ought to be
considered? In 2001, Kagan suggested that one counterargument to her
position would be if Congress "sometimes stipulated that a delegation ... to
an agency official was subject to the ultimate control of the President."76
The existence of such language might suggest more strongly, on an
expressio unius theory, that the failure to mention either the President or
presidential approval in another statute delegating authority to an agency
official should be understood as Congress's intent to insulate the official
from presidential directive authority. Stack responded to Kagan with a
review process. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1002(a), 116
Stat. 2135, 2268 (rewriting 40 U.S.C. § 11331).
72. Kagan, supra note 12, at 2328.
73. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
74. Id. § 732(a) (authorizing EPA Administrator to "promulgate regulations establishing
a program for the issuance of offset credits").
75. See Alison Winter, Kerry-Boxer Proposal Leaves Question Mark for Forestry
Groups, ENv'T & ENERGY DAILY, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/
public/EEDaily/2009/10/02/2 ("The new Senate text gives the [P]resident jurisdiction over
the potential program, rather than defining clear roles for USDA and U.S. EPA.").
76. Kagan, supra note 12, at 2329.
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collection of mixed delegations from the U.S. Code, arguing that their
existence signifies that congressional delegation only to an executive
agency official in other statutes, without mention of the President, must be
understood to preclude presidential directive authority.
Despite Kagan's statement in 2001, it is not clear how strong an
inference the difference in wording could yield, even if such mixed
delegations were commonplace. The argument assumes that Congress's
specifications of decisional procedures (such as presidential approvals) are
sufficiently particular that negative implications can be drawn from their
omission.
Congress, however, has expressly rejected any implication that a mixed
delegation is distinct from either a delegation to the agency or a delegation
directly to the President. Again, consider the Presidential Subdelegation
Act. The Act permits the President to treat as identical a delegation of
authority to the President by law and a mixed delegation of authority to an
agency official subject to presidential approval. The President is equally
empowered to delegate either function solely to an agency head "without
approval, ratification, or other action by the President."77 In other words, a
President can readily convert either a presidential delegation or a mixed
delegation into a simple delegation, reserving no formal approval authority
whatsoever. Confirming this understanding, once in a great while Congress
requires presidential approval and expressly refuses presidential authority to
redelegate that approval.78
Even if the language of a mixed delegation could be read to imply
reduced presidential involvement when a statute delegating to an executive
agency official contains no reference to the "President," the mixed
delegations Stack collects are not sufficient to support the inference he
wishes to draw from the simple delegation. Nearly all the statutes he cites
as examples of mixed delegations fall in one of three categories that makes
77. See 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) ("The President of the United States is authorized to
designate . . . [an agency official] to perform without approval, ratification, or other action
by the President (1) any function which is vested in the President by law, or (2) any function
which such officer is required or authorized by law to perform only with or subject to the
approval, ratification, or other action of the President .... ).
78. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 8374(e) (restricting delegation of Presidential authority to issue
emergency orders relating to energy supply); E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
347, § 302(a), 116 Stat. 2899, 2956 ("The President's authority to disapprove or modify such
[information security] standards and guidelines may not be delegated.") (current version,
without presidential disapproval, at 40 U.S.C. § 11331). Electronic searching in the U.S.
Code ("president /p 'may not be delegated"') revealed only fourteen such delegations.
Moreover, as Stack himself acknowledges, Congress occasionally delegates a decision to an
agency official "in the judgment" of the official, possibly implying the reservation of a
greater amount of control to the agency official than in the case of the simple delegation. See
Stack, supra note 4, at 288 n. 116. Stack may be correct that these delegations and simple
delegations are cognate ways of granting authority to the agency official, although one other
implication is that a delegation to the agency official without "judgment" is meant to include
greater space for presidential judgment. I would continue to read both of them against the
backdrop of presidential supervision. These delegations also might signal that, on review, a
court should be relatively deferential to the agency's final judgment on the matter.
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them less relevant: pre-1950, national security, or foreign relations. At
least twenty-seven of the statutes Stack cites that mention both the President
and an agency deal either with national security issues or with foreign
relations issues. 79 Both defense and foreign relations statutes potentially
represent special cases, in view of Article II's text describing the
President's powers not only as chief executive, but as "Commander in
Chief," and her authority, subject to Senate ratification, to "make
treaties."s 0 The statutes Stack discusses, for example, include one law
granting the power to "terminate any air service agreement between the
United States and a country" where a determination of dangerousness is
made,81 and the authority to suspend operations of air carriers to and from a
foreign country where the country is acting inconsistently with an
international convention on unlawful aircraft. 82 The potential of such a
suspension to disrupt foreign relations is obvious. Moreover, the
Presidential Subdelegation Act continues to apply, authorizing the President
to fully delegate her approval authority in these mixed delegations without
restriction. Beyond this, these particular mixed delegations might be
viewed as unique in their expectation of presidential involvement, owing
both to the foreign relations or defense context for the particular decision
and the decisions' relative infrequency. Thus, if the President did not elect
to redelegate the authority, it would be more reasonable to understand
Congress's view of presidential supervision in the particular context as both
more realistic and more valuable. No across-the-board inference about the
meaning of the simple delegation can fairly be drawn from these distinctive
mixed delegations.
With respect to domestic policy, many of the mixed delegation statutes
Stack cites and discusses are pre-1900, prior to the creation of the modern
supersized administrative state and well prior to the Presidential
Subdelegation Act. Fourteen of the mixed delegation statutes outside the
national security or defense setting he cites are pre-1900.83 (Eight statutes
79. These statutes are cited in Stack, supra note 4, at 278-85, nn.67-69, 74, 78-79, 84-
85, 87, 89-90, 92-98, 107. Two additional statutes that arguably fall in this category are
cited in id. at 281 n.85, 283 n.101. See also id. at 281 n.9 0 (citing E-Government Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 302(a), 116 Stat. 2899, 2956 (current, amended version at 40
U.S.C. § 11331(d)) ("To ensure fiscal and policy consistency, the Secretary shall exercise
the authority conferred by this section subject to direction by the President and in
coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.")). As explained in
note 71, the mixed delegation language in the E-Government Act dated from an earlier
statute, the Computer Security Act of 1987, that was specifically passed in response to DOD
assertions of control over federal government and contractor computer systems. It was part
of moving primary responsibility for computer security to a civilian agency, but subject to
express presidential oversight in view of national security issues. The presidential role in the
delegation has since been deleted.
80. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1-2.
81. 22 U.S.C. § 5605(b)(2)(F)(ii)(I).
82. See Stack, supra note 4, at 287 nn.109-12 and accompanying text (citing 49 U.S.C.
§§ 40106, 41302(b), 41304(b), 41302, 44907(d)(1)(D), 44907(e)).
83. See Stack, supra note 4, at 279-81 nn.72-80, 84 (citing older domestic mixed
delegation statutes).
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are both pre-1900 and relate to national security or defense issues. 84) Three
more mixed delegations outside the national security or defense setting are
pre-1950, before Congress enacted the Presidential Subdelegation Act.85
And as noted above, the Presidential Subdelegation Act now effectively
revises these statutes by permitting the President to convert freely a
presidential delegation or a mixed delegation into the equivalent of a simple
statutory delegation.
Of the multitude of statutes Stack discusses, twelve both are post-1950
and concern domestic policy issues. 86 Ten of the twelve require that the
action involve more than one executive branch agency, either through joint
rulemaking or through consultation. 87 This characteristic again suggests
that the mention of the President is not meant to indicate greater
presidential direction, but instead is an express command of coordination
among multiple executive branch agencies. Of the two remaining statutes,
the history and context of one, the E-Government Act of 2002, turns out to
implicate national security concerns.88  In the last one, the Full
Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978,89 the President is to act
"through the Secretary of Labor" to encourage full employment, but the
statute then sets forth criteria which the Secretary is to apply in "meeting
the responsibilities" under that section, undermining any inference that the
84. These statutes are cited in Stack, supra note 4, at 278-81 nn.67-69, 74, 78-79, 84.
85. See Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31, 37 (1933) (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. § 610(c)) (authorizing Secretary of Agriculture, with "approval of the President,"
to make regulations to carry out its provision); Stack, supra note 4, at 281 n.83 (citing Act of
Aug. 11, 1939, ch. 717, § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 590z); id. at 286 n.107 (citing Act of June 6, 1942,
ch. 380, 16 U.S.C. § 459r (authorizing Secretary of Interior "with the approval of the
President" to convey or lease "recreational demonstration projects")); see also 16 U.S.C.
§ 704 (first enacted 1918) (requiring presidential approval of Interior rules permitting
migratory bird hunting notwithstanding treaty).
86. These are cited in Stack, supra note 4, at 281-86 nn.85-86, 90, 91, 94, 99-101, 108.
87. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1701(6)
(coordination through multiple executive agency officials); 22 U.S.C. § 7104(b) (President to
establish programs "through" Secretaries of Labor, HHS, and State, and the Attorney
General); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 § 6, 22 U.S.C.
§ 7109a (providing for President to act through multiple agencies); 31 U.S.C. § 5341(a)(1)
(President to act "through" Treasury Secretary and Attorney General in developing strategy
to combat money laundering); 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1) (coordination with Commerce, Fish
and Wildlife Service, and EPA on damage assessment regulations); 40 U.S.C. § 17302(a)
(providing for joint Treasury and Postal Service rulemaking); 49 U.S.C. § 44302(d)
(providing for interagency consultation as condition of presidential approval of agency
decision to insure air carriers); Act of Sept. 8, 1982, Pub L. No. 97-254, 96 Stat. 808
(coordination between Commerce and other designated officials on 1984 Louisiana World
Expo); Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-169, 93 Stat. 1281 (coordination between
Commerce and other designated officials on 1982 International Energy Expo); see also 33
U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1) (authorizing the President "through" the Under Secretary of Commerce
for Oceans and Atmosphere to promulgate regulations for natural resource damage
assessment following oil discharge, in consultation with EPA and other agencies); supra
note 26-33 and accompanying text (citing delegations).
88. See supra notes 71, 78.
89. Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2011] 2473
HeinOnline  -- 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2473 2010-2011
FORDHAMLA WREVIEW
statute mentions the President particularly to ensure presidential direction or
the Secretary particularly to limit it.90
In sum, the mixed delegations Stack cites do not seem to rebut the
interpretation offered above. Absent some special context, a statutory
delegation to the "President" or to an executive agency does not seem to
represent a particular Congressional intent regarding the extent of
presidential direction or even supervision of agency action. By contrast, a
delegation to the President clearly is meant to authorize the President to
allocate the primary implementation responsibility, while a simple
delegation restricts that authority to allocate. In short, text alone is not
sufficient to resolve the statutory permissibility of presidential directive
authority.91
II. THE STAKES OF THE INTERPRETIVE DEBATE
The scholars who argue that a simple delegation implies some limit on
presidential control of an agency decision also argue that such an
interpretation is important because it can facilitate a useful agency
resistance to presidential control. As I briefly discuss below, however, the
very subtlety of the difference between "presidential supervision" and
"presidential direction" undermines the extent to which a simple delegation
might supply an agency head with greater resolve.
What the terms of the interpretive debate do underscore is a high level of
concern, particularly among these commentators, regarding presidential
supervision of agency action. I agree that presidential direction of agency
decision making can be potentially problematic.
In my view, however, the debate over statutory text is not helpful in
resolving precisely how much presidential control or direction of agency
activity is permissible. Instead, we should seek greater transparency to help
us uncover and evaluate whether presidential supervision and direction
enhances or detracts from the legitimacy of agency action.92 And an
improved understanding of the extent of presidential supervision and its
effects on agency action could inform legislation that actually does speak
specifically to presidential supervision.
90. Id. § 206; 15 U.S.C. § 3116. A possible explanation for the statute's reference to the
"President" is for consistency with other sections of the statute referencing the President.
91. Kagan argues at this point that resort must be had to general interpretive principles to
resolve the question left open by the text. See Kagan, supra note 11 at 2331 ("the statutory
question (whether the President, in exercising directive authority, is acting in accordance
with a standard delegation) . .. itself turns on a policy question (whether the action promotes
good administrative lawmaking)") That position is beyond the scope of this article, in view
of my discussion in Section II.
92. I have argued elsewhere that greater transparency is necessary for presidential
control to serve any legitimating function for the administrative state. See Nina Mendelson,
Disclosing "Political" Oversight ofAgency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1127, 1159
(2010) ("The lack of adequate transparency [undermines both] the appropriateness of
presidential influence and ... the legitimacy of agency decision making.").
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A. Backbone
Stack and Strauss make the particular argument that understanding a
simple delegation to deprive the President of directive authority could make
a difference to the attitude of agency officials. Such officials, they argue,
will have more fortitude with which to confront the erring President or his
staff if the authorizing statute can be read to give them, rather than the
President, the right to make the final call on the issue at hand.93 They
further assert that, given this understanding of the statute, a poorly
performing agency official would not be able to avoid accountability by
blaming the President. 94
With respect to agency accountability, however, agency officials rarely,
if ever, publicly point a blaming finger at the President. Agency statements
in support of a rule, for example, do not generally mention the President,
presidential preferences, or even the content of OMB/OIRA reviews. 95 If
anything, the problem is the reverse, with the President attempting to
maintain deniability for unpopular agency decisions.96
What about the argument that a simple delegation can supply an agency
official with greater resoluteness? The empirical basis for this claim is very
far from clear. Even if a simple delegation to an agency official were
intended to insulate the agency official from presidential directive authority
and merely make the President the "overseer," it would seem to make little
practical difference. As a formal matter, as all concede, the President
would still possess the power to remove. Moreover, the permissibility of
presidential oversight and supervision of executive branch agency decisions
is also widely conceded, including the President's ability to influence an
agency to prioritize one policy over another, to communicate strong policy
preferences, or to require that one agency meet the concerns of another in
reaching a decision. Even if a simple delegation were read to preclude
presidential directive authority, then, the President would continue to have
the power to coordinate, influence, or even cajole. 97
For the statutory language to prompt greater resistance, then, the agency
official responding to presidential pressure first would have to draw a line
between influence (permissible) and direction (impermissible), and the
93. See Stack, supra note 4, at 295. Sargentich argues that backbone will be most useful
in discussions not with the President, but with White House staff. Sargentich, supra note 3,
at 9; see Percival, supra note 4, at 1005 ("[T]he agency head will be bargaining with greater
moral authority than she would have if she knew the president had a right to dictate the
decision.").
94. Cf Strauss, supra note 1, at 712 ("[D]oes she take it as a command that she has a
legal as well as a political obligation to honor, and for whose justifications she thus has no
particular responsibility?" (emphasis added)).
95. See Mendelson, supra note 92, at 1146-59.
96. See id. at 1161-63; infra note 124-28 and accompanying text.
97. E.g., Percival, supra note 4, at 971 (simple delegation argument "does not mean that
the president is prohibited from communicating with the agency head concerning his
preferences for how the decision should be made"); Stack, supra note 3, at 294 ("[I]t will be
difficult for a court to police the line between presidential influence, on the one hand, and
presidential direction of agency action, on the other.").
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statute's interpretation would presumably only make a difference to the
agency official in the latter case. The line between those two situations is
bound to be difficult to draw.98 Consider the executive agency official
selected by the President, subject to at-will removal by the President, whose
agency rule is in the middle of the regulatory review process. The official
hears the following statement from a White House official involved in
regulatory review: "The President would really, really strongly prefer that
you select Option A." Is this permissible influence or impermissible
direction? A more difficult example: "The Agriculture Department's view
is that your preferred choice would cause tremendous difficulties with a
program they already administer. We must ask you to choose Option B to
avoid this conflict with Agriculture." In this latter case, Percival has argued
that the case for having the President resolve the conflict is "considerably
stronger because the White House is uniquely situated to resolve conflicts
between agencies." 99 Perhaps this is in part an argument why an agency
official, in the exercise of his or her decision-making authority, ought to
pay particular attention to the White House's view. But it is not clear why
this scenario represents any less displacement of the purported statutory
delegation. And if Agriculture's concerns, say, ought to be treated as
relevant by the decision-making agency, perhaps pushing that agency's
final decision in a different direction, why not the President's overall goals
for national policy? In short, the difficulty faced by an agency official in
applying this interpretation of statutory language to close cases means that a
simple delegation, even if it is interpreted as these commentators suggest, is
unlikely to add more than a touch of calcium to the agency official's bones.
Moreover, whatever the interpretation of the simple delegation, the
agency official also, as a practical matter, retains the same leverage. The
decision still must comply with substantive statutory criteria and
procedures, whether or not there is White House involvement. That
constrains the President's influence just as it constrains the agency's
discretion. 00 The agency official's view of what that law requires-and
what reasons best satisfy the law-will surely also influence the official's
willingness to accede to presidential influence, and that understanding is
likely to be clearer than identifying whether presidential influence has
overstepped the line of "direction."
Second, the agency official still has practical control of the institution
that must, in the first instance, develop the record supporting the rule
(whether it is automotive fuel efficiency standards or contaminated site
cleanup standards), either because the statute names the agency or the
President has delegated the authority to the agency by executive order. The
98. Cf Sargentich, supra note 3, at 21 ("[T]he distinction between presidential
influence, supervision, advice, and persuasion on the one hand, and controlling, displacing,
commanding, and directing on the other, can be subtle in practice.").
99. Percival, supra note 4, at 998.
100. Percival describes, for example, an HHS Secretary's successful argument to
President George H.W. Bush that his desired policy choice was not supported by the
rulemaking record. Id. at 994-95.
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White House needs the cooperation of the agency official, including the
staff and resources at her disposal, and this represents an ongoing incentive
for the White House to negotiate with agency staff, rather than to direct. 0 '
Third, if the statute contains a simple delegation, the statute's plain
language probably precludes the President from signing a Federal Register
notice if the agency official does not, even if the simple delegation is
interpreted to include presidential directive authority. (In the event of a
presidential delegation redelegated to an agency official, the President
would have to revoke the delegation to sign the Federal Register notice. 102)
This, too, gives the agency official some leverage, though one implication
of the textual analysis above is that it may not be leverage specifically
intended by Congress. 103
Finally, whatever the simple delegation's interpretation, the agency
official retains leverage in a particular case to inflict political costs on the
President by resigning in protest or by forcing the President to fire her.104
Whether a President's pressure amounts to impermissible directive
authority or pressuring influence-and even if the statute says "President"
and the agency official has received the power by delegation-the agency
official can respond, "I won't do it; you will have to fire me." Strauss
alludes to two agency officials who told 'the President to pound sand ...
[and] the President knew they had the political capital to win."' 0 Without
knowing the circumstances at hand, we cannot know for sure whether the
statutes these officials were enforcing contained simple delegations directly
to the agency official. More critically, the public is highly unlikely to know
that information. Either way, the officials could impose the same political
costs on the President.
Strauss also recounts the story of President Andrew Jackson's efforts to
get two Treasury Secretaries to remove the government's funds from the
National Bank and deposit them in state banks. The Secretaries refused and
had to be removed. Ultimately, Jackson appointed Roger B. Taney Acting
Secretary, and Taney complied, resulting in a "political furor" and a Senate
Resolution of Censure against Taney. Strauss argues that this narrative in
101. Cf Kagan, supra note 12, at 2272-73 (noting that Presidents Richard Nixon and
Jimmy Carter both viewed themselves as being surrounded by hostile and unresponsive
bureaucracies).
102. Such a revocation would be highly unusual, and I have not succeeded in locating
one.
103. Cf Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1544,
1546 (9th Cir. 1993) (prohibition on ex parte contacts applied to President when formal
adjudication decision vested in other agency officials despite arguments that the President is
the "center of the Executive Branch").
104. See Sargentich, supra note 3, at 8 ("There is an outer limit on the number or
frequency of terminations that any administration can tolerate without suffering the negative
political repercussions of instability.").
105. Strauss, supra note 1, at 736; see also Percival, supra note 4, at 995 (reporting that
Federal Drug Administration Administrator Kessler and HHS Secretary Sullivan were
prepared to resign over dispute with the White House on content of nutritional disclosure
rule).
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part illustrates Jackson's acceptance of the proposition that "his control lay
only over the officeholder and was not a power of decision."1 06 The
narrative also illustrates, however, the power of top agency officials to
inflict political costs on the President by forcing him to remove them. In
Percival's words, when an executive officer refuses to follow the
President's preferences, it serves "as an alarm signal to the public that the
president may not be acting with fidelity to the law or in the best interest of
the country."10 7
The hero of this type of story is the agency official who stands up for the
right decision, even at the significant personal cost of losing her job. The
wording of the statute changes little, if anything at all, about either the
President's ability to remove the official or the agency official's ability to
force her to that point. And the official may gain the sense of gratification
that comes with knowing he or she has done the right thing, as well as
public accolades and the respect of his or her peers.
Regarding the official's ability to resist inappropriate presidential
pressure or positions, other features of the agency official's position might
be just as important as whether the statute says "Administrator" or
"President" (delegated through Executive Order to the "Administrator.").
Consider a recent statement from Professor Jack Goldsmith, former head of
the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel, and now well-known
for standing up to White House officials:
It's important that there be a Senate-confirmed person at the head of the
Office of Legal Counsel, both because it helps secure the independence of
the office when it's making legal judgments and because it helps give the
office more authority, both within the Justice Department and throughout
the government. 108
Top agency officials, of course, generally possess this imprimatur of
authority.109
106. Strauss, supra note 1, at 707 n.56; see id. at 706-07 nn.47-57.
107. Id. at 963.
108. Carrie Johnson, Obama Picks New Nominee for Legal Counsel's Office, NPR, Jan.
5, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/01/05/132681380/obama-picks-new-nominee-for-legal-
counsels-office (quoting former Office of Legal Counsel head Jack Goldsmith on the
nomination of Virginia Seitz to head the office). Goldsmith authored The Terror
Presidency, recounting his attempt to stand up to the George W. Bush White House. See
generally Strauss, supra note 1, at 718 ("[P]olitical obligations to the Senate, even promises
made, may create back-currents that can stiffen resolve against presidential prodding.");
Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 9, 2007, at 40
(profiling Goldsmith).
109. See generally Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top
Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 913, 913-14 (2009) ("[O]ver 1100 Senate-confirmed
presidential appointees are supposed to run [federal] agencies and direct these policy
decisions, comprising a small but critically important component of a federal workforce of
over 2.5 million employees.").
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B. Addressing Presidential Supervision Directly
Finally, it is worth focusing on why the interpretive issue has prompted
so much debate, given the lack of statutory clarity on the question. The
interpretive argument made by Stack, Strauss, Sargentich, and Percival, if
accepted, theoretically empowers agency officials to resist the White
House's growing assertions of power to control the agencies. As I have
argued, however, statutes with simple delegations to executive agency
officials cannot generally be read to communicate a distinctive intent
regarding presidential directive authority, compared with a typical
presidential delegation. And even reading simple delegations this way may
not particularly strengthen an agency official's hand against the President.
Meanwhile, other features of the executive branch, the statutes, and the
President-agency relationship may offer support for an agency official in
resisting presidential policy preferences she sees as wrong.
Ultimately, then, interpreting the term "Secretary" or "Administrator"
will not resolve the question whether the President should be directing an
executive branch agency's actions. As we assess the broader question of
the desirable scope of presidential control, we should put the textual
question aside; greater disclosure and assessment of the effects of
presidential control would be a more useful approach.
As has been widely noted, Presidents have been claiming ever-increasing
power to supervise decisions traditionally developed primarily in the
agencies. That has raised concerns, particularly to the extent that oversight
operates to displace or dismiss valuable agency experience and expertise
that has developed over long periods of time. 110 That oversight could
displace agency expertise either in the context of a particular decision or in
an agency's determination of which issues deserve top priority.
Further, as Strauss has argued, agency decision making may have
significant institutional advantages compared with presidential or White
House decision making. For example, presidential directive authority is
likely to mean, practically, not that the President herself makes the decision,
but rather that the decision will be made "within an apparatus of a few
thousand White House employees" in a relatively opaque institution "in
contrast to a decision reached by a politically accountable agency
administrator with the help of a more extensive and expert staff operating
under those conditions of enhanced transparency and procedural
regularity."III As Strauss argues, an agency notice and comment
rulemaking process is surely more public than comparatively opaque White
House deliberations, and agency officials are more available for
110. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 92, at 1141-44 (outlining types of presidential
pressure that "seem clearly out of bounds").
111. Strauss, supra note 1, at 753; see also id. at 754 (The "President's will" will often be
a "bolt of lightning hurled by one unelected operative" with more political pressure, less
staff support, stretched expertise, and fewer obligations of procedural regularity, compared
with "another unelected operative enjoying significant virtues from a rule-of-law
perspective.").
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congressional oversight hearings than the President, although the President
and her staff might reasonably be understood to be more politically
accountable through the electoral process.1 12 One risk here is that well-
organized interest groups may have particular access to the White House, or
that the White House may have a particular axe to grind that should not be
seen as relevant to the policy decision.11 3
These arguments, only briefly summarized here, all suggest that
presidential authority over executive branch agencies tends to degrade,
rather than to legitimate, decision making in the administrative state. This
is consistent with a concern occasionally expressed both in congressional
hearings and in some court opinions about "raw politics" entering agency
decision making.11 4 As I have argued elsewhere, moreover, a President
certainly should not be able to push an agency official to disregard legal
requirements or to slant scientific findings either in deciding the content of
a particular action or in deciding that no action at all should be taken.11 5
These issues are implicated in recent allegations regarding political
manipulation of agency scientific research.11 6  This "White House
supervision," to the extent it occurs, seems out of bounds.
Strauss, Sargentich, Stack, and Percival all argue persuasively that to the
extent presidential power, whether to influence or direct, is misdirected,
agency resistance can be a highly useful offset. "The representation of
112. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32397, FEDERAL
RULEMAKING: THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
SUMMARY (2009) ("[OMB] is part of the Executive Office of the President, and helps ensure
that covered agencies' rules reflect the President's policies and priorities."); Kagan, supra
note 12, at 2338 (arguing that Office of Management and Budget/Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OMB/OIRA) review is part of presidential supervision); Mendelson,
supra note 92, at 1147.
113. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1306 (2006) (suggesting President may be as susceptible to
interest group pressures as agency is); see, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of
Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 85 (2006) ("According to 57% of EPA
respondents, interest groups were sometimes able to persuade the White House to seek
changes in EPA rule-makings, and 29% said often."). But see Steven Croley, White House
Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 882
(2003) ("Nor does the White House appear to cater to certain types of interests and not
others.").
114. E.g., Sargentich, supra note 3, at 35 ("By being somewhat shielded from the political
process, agencies arguably are well-suited to address difficult issues on the merits without
constant intrusions of raw politics into the process."); Stack, supra note 4, at 322 ("[W]e are
better off with a conception of the agency official's role that emphasizes the official's
independent duty under the law . . .. [and] it depends on the good judgment of those who
exercise authority.").
115. See Mendelson, supra note 92, at 1141 (arguing that "out of bounds" presidential
pressure includes influence "that prompts the agency to ignore its factual or technical
conclusions").
116. See Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86
TEx. L. REV. 1601, 1603-19 (2008); Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor, Rescuing Science
from Politics: Regulation and the Distortion of Scientific Research, White Paper No. 604
(Ctr. for Progressive Reform, 2006), available at http://www.progressivereform.org
/articles/RescuingScience 604.pdf.
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diversity is a key attribute of a well-functioning system of checks and
balances" that critiques the ratification of "the preferences of a single power
center."117 And, in Stack's words, "the mere possibility of resistance [by
an executive official] creates a legal check on presidential abuse internal to
the executive branch: [t]he President must persuade or fire the official,
rather than simply bind that official to his views."118 In the context of
assessing the effects of personnel "burrowing" at the end of a Presidency, I
have similarly argued that viewpoint diversity inside agencies, as well as
the presence of civil service holdovers in relatively senior positions from
previous administrations, can result in an agency considering a wider range
of important viewpoints and the potential moderation, stabilization, and
improvement of agency policies.11 9 As Neal Katyal has argued, the civil
service can serve as an important check on executive power.120
But we simply do not know that White House supervision, or even
direction, is all distorting or inappropriate and that, accordingly, we should
want to maximize, at all costs, executive agency resistance. 121 Presidential
supervision also has its well-recognized virtues-coordination, direction,
and energy among them-and as Jerry Mashaw argued, the ability to take a
national perspective. 122 That perspective may be relatively lacking in
Congress.123 Taking the broader view is clearly also valuable compared to
the narrow jurisdictional view likely to be taken by the leadership of an
individual agency.
Further, agency decision making is not flawless either. Like presidential
decision making, agency decision making can be irrational, myopic, or
overly responsive to particular interest groups.124 Consider the scandal
involving EPA official Rita Lavelle and EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch
Burford during the Reagan years. The Burford/Lavelle scandal, one of the
biggest government scandals during that period, centered around allegations
that the EPA's Superfund hazardous waste cleanup program was tainted by
conflicts of interest and managed for political purposes, and that the agency
117. Sargentich, supra note 3, at 6.
118. Stack, supra note 4, at 316, 322; accord Sargentich, supra note 3, at 35.
119. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel
Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 557, 646 (2003); see also Nina
Mendelson, Midnight Rulemaking and Congress, in TRANSITIONS (Austin Sarat ed.,
forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 13) (on file with author) (arguing that less policy making
dialogue may take place inside White House compared with Congress).
120. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking
Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
121. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 113, at 50 ("[Slelective [presidential]
intervention is not all bad. It may comport with political priorities and even facilitate
political accountability where it happens to exist.").
122. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE To
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 152-53 (1997); accord THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander
Hamilton).
123. See MASHAw, supra note 122, at 153.
124. See generally Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REv. SEE ALSO (2010),
http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol89/pdf/89TexasLRevSeeAlsol.pdf
(discussing measures to reduce "agency capture").
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negotiated "sweetheart deals" with companies responsible for hazardous
waste cleanup.125  It is worth noting that although the White House
disclaimed responsibility for the officials' actions, the EPA was
implementing a statute where the delegations ran almost entirely to the
President. 126 Rather than the agency officials avoiding accountability by
blaming the President, this was, if anything, a situation where the President
blamed the agencies and tried to distance himself from agency function. In
the words of a contemporaneous newspaper article, "The White House has
consistently stated that it had minimal contact with the agency on the
conduct of the toxic waste programs" although "White House contacts with
Miss Lavelle when she was running the toxic waste programs were 'far
more extensive [than] either Ms. Lavelle or White House officials have
acknowledged."' 1 27 After a variety of problems at EPA were publicly
reported, White House officials announced that the White House "ha[d]
begun keeping a close watch over the [EPA]."l 28
Commentators have also criticized agency decision making as sometimes
flawed and shortsighted and as misallocating resources. In his academic
writings, Justice Breyer argued, for example, that three significant problems
plagued agency decision making: "tunnel vision," randomness in agency
selection of regulatory targets, and inconsistency among agency regulatory
approaches.1 29 Presidential oversight and coordination may be valuable to
offset these tendencies.
Further, as I have argued elsewhere, there is nothing inherently
delegitimizing about an agency considering reasons offered by elected
officials-so-called "political reasons."1 30 As I have argued, whether those
reasons prove problematic can depend on the content both of those reasons
and of the question the agency must resolve. Consider that within their
broad delegations, agencies now receive from Congress the authority to
resolve far more than technical questions. The significant issues agencies
resolve very often include what we might consider core questions of
value-whether risks presented are "unreasonable"'31 or whether particular
125. See, e.g., Philip Shabecoff, Rita Lavelle Gets 6-Month Term and is Fined $10,000
for Perjury, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1984, at Al (Rita Lavelle charged with "favoritism to
business and Republican political candidates and failure to use the $1.6 billion hazardous
waste cleanup fund in a timely fashion to clean up toxic waste sites").
126. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54 (discussing delegations to President in
CERCLA).
127. House Report on E.P.A. Charges White House Still Withholds Data, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 1984, at A13; accord C.M. Cameron Lynch, Note, Environmental Awareness and
the New Republican Party: The Re-Greening of the GOP?, 26 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 215, 222 (2001) (describing Burford/Lavelle scandal).
128. Philip Shabecoff, White House Has E.P.A. on Political "Watch List", N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 1982, at Bl l.
129. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE Vicious CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 11-29 (1993).
130. See Mendelson, supra note 92, at 1141-46.
131. See 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1)(A) (2006) (regarding regulation of dietary supplements
that present "significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury"); 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(8)
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standards are "reasonably necessary or appropriate" to protect health.132
These may require resolving debates about whether, say, the government
should address known risks by setting standards and restricting the sale of
products or whether disclosure of information is sufficient to make risks
"reasonable" because consumers can make their own choices.133 Take the
recent debate regarding whether the Department of Agriculture should
permit New York City to restrict the use of federal food stamps to purchase
sodas. This issue that surely involves more than the impact of soda on
nutritional health.134
A central argument for the legitimacy of the administrative state,
including its priority-setting and resolution of value-laden questions,135 has
been that agencies are accountable to the President, who is in turn
accountable to the electorate. Agencies are thus more likely to be
democratically responsive in resolving these questions of value. Arguments
that agency decisions can be seen as more legitimate because of presidential
control have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere, including in my own
work.136 One obvious implication of this sort of argument, though, is that
presidential supervision of agency decisions can be desirable and
legitimating.
I have recently argued elsewhere that if presidential influence is to serve
any legitimating function for agency conduct, greater disclosure of the
content of presidential supervision-even in abbreviated form-is
essential.137 Otherwise, the electorate may not fully understand the extent
of actual or potential presidential supervision of agency decisions,
particularly given presidential efforts to maintain "deniability."l 38 Under
(defining "motor vehicle safety" as performance in a way that "protects the public against
unreasonable risk of accidents occurring").
132. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) ("The term 'occupational safety and health standard' means
a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means,
methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment.").
133. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 4, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,822 (Jan. 18, 2011)
("[E]ach agency shall identify and consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and
maintain flexibility and freedom of choice . ... These approaches include warnings ... and
disclosure requirements .... ).
134. See Anemona Hartocollis, Food Stamps as New Front in Soda Wars, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2010, at Al.
135. Strauss acknowledges that on issues of agenda setting, "one might find considerably
greater room for the presumption of directorial authority." Strauss, supra note 1, at 757.
136. See generally MASHAW, supra note 122, at 152-53 (describing presidential control
model); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REv. 441 (2010) (criticizing presidential control model);
Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex
World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 987 (1997) (same); Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and
Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 357 (2010) (same); Kagan, supra note 12, at 2339-40; Mendelson, supra
note 92, at 1135-38 (describing and critiquing presidential control model).
137. See Mendelson, supra note 92, at 1146-59.
138. See id. at 1161-62; supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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these circumstances, holding the President accountable through the electoral
process for actions of the administrative state will be doubtful at best.
But the needed transparency is lacking. Presidential influence over
agency decision making, though it is extensive, remains surprisingly
opaque. Although the vast majority of significant agency rules are changed
in the regulatory review process in OIRA, the content of OIRA influence
over the regulatory review process is difficult to discern, as I have
documented elsewhere. That information is difficult to locate and
systematically disclosed by neither OIRA nor the agency.139  And
Presidents continue to choose to distance themselves from agency function
even as they seek to influence it. In January, 2011, for example, President
Barack Obama wrote an op-ed that included a story of the EPA's
maintaining a hazardous designation for saccharin despite the FDA's
approval of it for consumption as he laid out principles for a "21st century
regulatory system."l 40 Greater disclosure would help the electorate better
understand the extent of presidential control, as well as possibly helping to
deter presidential influence that we would see as negative or corrupting of
the agency decision-making process.
More to the point, greater disclosure also would help us assess the
content of presidential influence over agencies and evaluate whether
presidential influence should be seen as beneficial in the main, a vehicle for
special interest pressure, or second-guessing to poor effect technical
expertise that traditionally has resided in the agencies. In turn, that could
help inform legislation, particularly in the domestic policy setting, that
actually does speak clearly to presidential supervision.
CONCLUSION
Strauss, Stack, Percival, and Sargentich have all argued that we should
construe statutory delegations, where possible, to increase the ability of
executive branch agency officials to resist presidential control. An active
policy dialogue within the executive branch that thoroughly engages both
presidential and agency offices seems likely to prompt better overall
decision making simply because a wider range of viewpoints will be
expressed in such a deliberation. And agency resistance offers something
of a safeguard against misguided presidential decision making, as
presidential supervision does in the case of agency decision making.
Whether construing a simple delegation as limiting presidential directive
authority would help increase agency resistance, as these commentators
139. Mendelson, supra note 92, at 1146-70. A search of the OIRA review database on
www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport, as well as a review of the results, revealed
that of all economically significant rules for which review was completed in calendar year
2010, not one of the 138 rules was reported as approved without change. Results are on file
with author. Of the 138 rules identified in the search, 132 were reported as "approved
consistent with change" or "withdrawn," and six as "statutory or judicial deadline" without
information on change.
140. See Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Toward a 21st Century Regulatory System, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 18, 2011, at Al7.
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argue, is far from clear, however. And Kagan's position that a simple
delegation cannot generally be interpreted as a distinctive congressional
effort to limit presidential direction is ultimately the more convincing
position.
It is also unclear whether the President ought to be the "decider" of a
difficult question delegated by Congress to the executive branch or whether
an executive agency official should make the final call. In my view, that
may depend on the question's content-whether it is primarily technical or
one of value. It also may depend on the processes used in the agency, the
White House, or both. Rather than searching for meaning that turns out to
be largely absent in the statutory texts, we should seek greater disclosure of
presidential supervision to help us evaluate this question and potentially
inform legislation that does speak specifically to whether Presidents may
direct agency action.
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